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A Resilience Engineering perspective 
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I explore the potential contribution a Resilience 
Engineering perspective could offer towards a better understanding 
and improvement of patient safety.  I argue that performance 
variability is an essential component in the delivery of safe care, as 
practitioners translate tensions they encounter in their everyday work 
into safe practices through dynamic trade-offs based on their 
experience and the requirements of the specific situation.  Health 
care organisations and health policy makers should consider 
identifying ways that enable organisations to learn about 




It is widely recognised that patients across all healthcare systems may suffer 
preventable harm [1, 2].  Research from various countries and different 
medical settings provides evidence suggesting that 4% - 12% of patients 
experience an adverse event during the course of their treatment, and that 
half of these may have been preventable [3-6].  This causes needless harm 
and suffering to patients, and it can be traumatic for the practitioners involved 
[7].  In the UK, the scandal surrounding appalling standards of care at Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust created much media attention.  The 
ensuing Public Inquiry found that between 2005 and 2009 as many as 1,200 
patients died needlessly [8].  There are significant financial implications in 
terms of litigation and additional treatment costs; for example it is estimated 
that the costs associated with adverse drug events in the National Health 
Service (NHS) are £0.5-1.9B annually [9].  
In order to improve patient safety health care organisations have been 
turning to safety-critical industries, such as aviation, in order to harness 
learning about safety management practices [10, 11].  Approaches that have 
been carried across from industry include the reporting and analysis of 
incidents, standardisation of processes, and the introduction of aviation-style 
checklists [12, 13].  However, the adoption of solutions from ultra-safe 
industries (e.g. aviation) has met with variable success [14, 15], and 
questions have been raised about the applicability and suitability of traditional 
safety management approaches in health care settings [16, 17].   
Considering the difficulties of applying traditional safety management 
approaches in health care, a group of clinicians and academics from the 
Resilience Engineering community have been developing over the past five 
years an alternative approach of looking at patient safety – Resilient Health 
Care [18-20].  In this paper I explore the potential contribution a Resilience 
Engineering perspective could offer towards a better understanding and 
improvement of patient safety.  I argue that performance variability is an 
essential component in the delivery of safe care, as practitioners translate 
tensions they encounter in their everyday work into safe practices through 
dynamic trade-offs based on their experience and the requirements of the 
specific situation.  The positive contribution of performance variability, and 
the role of trade-offs are frequently overlooked in traditional safety 
management approaches.  A Resilience Engineering perspective might 
provide novel insights into why progress with patient safety has been slow, 
and what kind of recommendations might be appropriate in the future.   
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section I briefly review some of 
the problems with the traditional approach to safety management using the 
example of clinical handover.  I then provide a critique of safety management 
as currently practiced in health care based on a Resilience Engineering 
perspective.  I conclude the paper with recommendations for practice and for 
research.         
2 THE TROUBLE WITH CLINICAL HANDOVER 
Clinical handover refers to the activity of transferring professional 
responsibility and accountability for the care of a patient from one health care 
professional to another.  Clinical handover can occur at scheduled times in 
the form of shift handover, where responsibility for an entire group of patients 
is transferred.  Clinical handover also occurs for individual patients, for 
example when patients are transferred from the ambulance to the emergency 
department [21].  These latter types of handover are particularly vulnerable 
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as they involve practitioners with different professional backgrounds, and 
from different organisations (or departments) [22, 23].   
A large body of research demonstrates that inadequate clinical handover 
practices are putting patients at risk [24-26].  Handover failures can lead to 
delays in treatments [27], medication errors [28], unnecessary duplication of 
assessments [29], and poor patient experience [2].   
Studies of handover often approach this activity from a traditional safety 
management perspective.  The problem with handover is framed rather 
narrowly as the failure of the transfer of information from a sender to a 
receiver [30]. Accordingly, it is frequently suggested, and attempted in 
practice, to reduce failures in clinical handover in a normative way through 
the introduction of procedures and standardised, structured communication 
protocols based on mnemonics such as the popular SBAR (Situation, 
Background, Assessment, Recommendation) [31]. Reviews of the literature 
on clinical handover conclude, however, that there is no reliable body of 
evidence to suggest that these attempts have been successful [24, 32]. This 
echoes cautions that the narrow perspective on information transfer may be 
potentially impoverishing and limiting [33].   
3 RESILIENT HEALTH CARE 
Standardisation, communication protocols and checklists can be regarded as 
instances of formal assumptions about how work should be carried out – 
work-as-imagined (WAI) [34].  However, recent literature in the area of 
Resilient Health Care provides many examples that the way everyday clinical 
work is actually unfolding – work-as-done (WAD) – is necessarily different 
from what those who design and manage health care systems assume [18-
20].  Modern health care systems are characterised by changing demands 
and finite resources giving rise to competing organisational priorities, such as 
the management of patient flows and time-related performance targets [22].  
Health care systems might be regarded more appropriately as Systems of 
Systems [35] or Complex Adaptive Systems [36].  The complexity of this 
context creates tensions [37] that clinicians have to resolve and to translate 
into safe practices through dynamic trade-offs on a daily basis [38, 39].    
Such necessary performance adjustments contribute to organisational 
resilience [40].  More generally, resilient health care systems have been 
described as systems capable of anticipating and adapting to surprises and 
changes, and of monitoring their response and learning from their 
performance [40].    
Empirical studies of clinical handover provide a diverse range of examples of 
performance adjustments in practice [38, 39].  For example, when 
ambulances are queuing at the emergency department, ambulance crews 
might hand over their patient to another crew waiting in line in order to save 
time.  The second crew will then be less familiar with the patient when they 
eventually hand over the patient to the emergency department staff.  
Ambulance crews in this instance are trading the risk of not meeting clinical 
need in the community due to queuing with the risk of having a poor quality 
handover from a crew who are not familiar with the patient.  The empirical 
work demonstrated that clinicians resolve such tensions dynamically, and 
sometimes in violation of formal procedures, based on the specifics of the 
situation and on their sense of “being worried” about the patient in their care 
[38, 39].  Often, the ability to make such performance adjustments and trade-
offs in order to deal with competing demands and changing conditions are 
fundamental to keeping patients safe.  This ability is a key characteristic of 
Resilient Health Care systems.        
4 CONCLUSION 
What keeps patients safe? We know from the literature that patients are not 
as safe as one might hope. Traditional safety engineering applied to health 
care settings focuses on those situations, where harm occurred [41].  The 
aim is to generate learning about failures in order to prevent those failures 
from happening in the future.  This is a reasonable aim, and sometimes 
progress with patient safety can be made as a result.  Looking at patient 
safety from a different angle, one might say that, most of the time, patients 
actually receive good quality care.  The reason for that is because clinicians, 
clinical teams and health care organisations are able to make adjustments 
and dynamic trade-offs.   
Health care organisations and health policy makers should consider 
identifying ways that enable organisations to learn about performance 
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variability and trade-offs from everyday clinical work [42, 43].  While 
standardisation and checklists have their place in certain situations, so do 
performance variability and trade-offs.  When something goes wrong, 
performance variability of individuals and deviation from WAI should not be 
identified as the root cause.  Alternative learning mechanisms should be 
explored and supported.  For example, less formal learning structures, such 
as lunchtime working groups or inter-departmental peer discussion groups 
often form around specific problems with the aim of bringing about useful 
change and improvement [14].  These activities are not normally considered 
part of an organisation’s learning infrastructure, and no organisational 
support is provided.  Organisations should consider harnessing the positive 
contribution of such informal, local learning by actively encouraging staff 
participation and by providing resource where possible, for example through 
the explicit introduction of improvement time into staff working hours.        
Recognising the positive contribution performance variability can make, and 
encouraging staff to raise concerns and to propose improvements requires a 
certain type of organisational culture based on trust between individuals, and 
between individuals and the organisation.  Organisations need to work hard 
in order to overcome a culture of blame and fear, and to progress towards a 
culture that is open and just, and aimed at continuous improvement, for 
example through the use of exectutive and interdisciplinary walk arounds, 
team building and communication initiatives [44, 45].  Organiations need to 
ensure that staff are being listened to, and that their concerns and 
suggestions are taken seriously.      
Research in Resilient Health Care has focused on identifying and describing 
resilience mechansims in order to raise awareness, and to build explanatory 
frameworks.  Resarch needs to start moving beyond description, in order to 
facilitate the adoption of Resilience Engineering in clinical practice.         
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